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Abstract: Protection of personal data in the Internet is already a challenge today. Users have to
actively look up privacy policies of websites and decide whether they can live with the terms of
use. Once discovered, they are forced to make a ”‘take or leave”’ decision. In future living and
working environments, where sensors and context-aware services are pervasive, this becomes an
even greater challenge and annoyance. The environment is much more personalized and users
cannot just ”‘leave”’. They require measures to prevent, avoid and detect misuse of sensitive
data, as well as to be able to negotiate the purpose of use of data. We present a novel model
of privacy protection, complementing the notion of enterprise privacy with the incorporation of
personal privacy towards a holistic privacy management system. Our approach allows non-expert
users not only to negotiate the desired level of privacy in a rather automated and simple way, but
also to track and monitor the whole life-cycle of data.
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1 Introduction
Pervasive computing has the potential of deeply affecting many aspects of our daily
lives. In the same way that cell phones and mobile services are changing our awareness
of and the interaction with our friends and family today, tomorrow, the advent of the
pervasive computing age will foster the deployment of a huge number of context-aware
mobile services (CAMS). Our everyday routines may change drastically and new is-
sues may emerge. One of the fundamental problems is that pervasive computing raises
serious privacy concerns. The collection of data related to the context of an individual
increases hugely. It is easy to process and share personal information with a large num-
ber of smart services. We believe that pervasive computing will change our perception
of privacy in an even more substantial manner than the Internet did.
Privacy is already a prime concern in today’s information society. The challenge
now is to design pervasive computing systems including effective privacy protection
mechanisms. Obviously, there will not be a single “magic” solution to safeguard indi-
viduals’ privacy. Pervasive privacy protection will require the integration of a significant
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number of heterogeneous mechanisms and the cooperation of different entities. Entities
involved in the process of gathering and compiling personal data. Including those en-
tities that not always can be trusted with respect to the enforcement of privacy, since
certain interests (especially commercial ones) might prevail over enforcing someone’s
privacy preferences.
Our work is based on the claim that it is not sufficient to rely only on enterprise’s
willingness to support individual’s privacy requirements, as it is typically deemed suf-
ficient today. Protecting individuals’ privacy in pervasive computing requires an ad-
ditional level of privacy protection, which we named personal privacy enforcement:
Together with the enforcement of enterprise’s privacy statements, government policies
and privacy laws, it is necessary to deploy mechanisms specifically for defining, com-
municating and enforcing people’s privacy preferences. This is in accordance to what
Marc Langheinrich stated in [Lan01]: “Protecting people’s privacy is a very personal
affair. Something that cannot be solved without taking people’s habits, preferences, and
moral views into account”. Thus, we need means to empower users to decide by them-
selves on the exchange of personal data on a much simpler, automatic, and finer-grained
level than it is possible today to prevent them from losing their privacy to enterprises
and data sellers in the near future [OAB07].
Our approach is to make privacy protection a cooperative task of all parties involved.
We developed a novel privacy enforcement model based on a Trusted Privacy Manager,
as a central abstraction. It orchestrates disclosure of personal data and manages the
collaboration with third parties. We designed and developed the User-centric Privacy
Framework as reference implementation of such a Trusted Privacy Manager. When we
addressed its realization, we had to keep in mind three conflicting user wishes. Users
want to keep their sensitive data private. On the contrary, they also want to get the most
value from the services they use. And they want to understand what is going on. These
are the three principles that we have to balance, namely: Privacy Protection, Service
Usability and User Manageability. We are confident that it is possible to make great
progress in pervasive privacy protection by building a solid privacy model, like the one
introduced in this paper, which favors the combination and integration of personal and
enterprise privacy.
2 Privacy Protection in Pervasive Computing
Laws and enterprise privacy alone are not sufficient to prevent an unwanted intrusion
into the private sphere of an individual. Privacy is a very subjective concept: What is
acceptable to one person may be unacceptable to another. Users of pervasive computing
systems need mechanisms to control and manage their own privacy concerns. For in-
stance, by limiting who has access to what data and under which circumstances, which
typically may be achieved by using privacy policies.
However, purely technological solutions, such as policy systems for access control,
by themselves, can achieve privacy goals only in certain situations. They are necessary
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Figure 1: Privacy Design Space for Pervasive Computing
but not sufficient. Privacy control in pervasive computing requires the integration of
several complementary mechanisms following a new design space.
We have classified technical solutions into measures for: privacy aware access con-
trol, anonymity, obfuscation, usage control, awareness, feedback and detection, and
represented them within the privacy design space defined by Jiang et al. [JHL02]. This
privacy design space, shown in Figure 1, is taken as the reference frame for the solu-
tions presented in this article. We consider it to represent and cover quite accurately the
new privacy needs of users of pervasive computing applications. It categorizes privacy
protection technologies into measures for prevention, avoidance, and detection at the
different stages of the data lifecycle: collection, access, and secondary use.
Privacy in pervasive computing environments requires the deployment of measures
for: i) prevention, to ensure that undesirable use of personal data does not occur. Within
the group of preventative measures we include privacy aware access control, obfusca-
tion and anonymity; ii) measures for avoidance, to minimize the risks and maximize the
benefits associated with data exchanges. By using mechanisms for awareness, feedback
and usage control, the flow of information from data consumers back to data owners
can be increased. Users need to be aware of personal privacy issues to properly apply
privacy control and avoid risky situations during the three phases of the data life cycle;
iii) finally, measures for detection, to detect unwanted misuses of disclosed data and act
accordingly.
Protection during collection refers to the event in which personal data is initially
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collected. Important decisions should be made at this phase including who can collect
what data, under which circumstances, in which format, and how trusted is the data
collector. Access refers to the point at which data is accessed, for a particular purpose, by
the ultimate recipient. Important decisions concerning this phase are how accurate and
how confident the data should be, who should be allowed to access it, for what purpose,
how accesses should be logged or how data is supposed to be stored. Secondary use
refers to the use of data after initial access has been made. Secondary use may also
include passing data from one party, who might have been authorized, to another party,
who might be not. Important decisions made in this phase should include who else
should be able to access the data, secondary use purposes, and whether it is allowed to
share the data with others or how long the data can be stored.
Summing up, within this privacy space we classify personal privacy policies as a
preventative mechanism used at collection time. The data owners can specify the list
of constraints that need to be fulfilled before granting a collection request. Enterprise
policies are enforced afterwards by the receiving service, to limit the access to au-
thorized service’s users and only for authorized purposes, acting as an avoidance and
preventative measure at access. On the other hand, technical solutions for awareness
are considered as an avoidance measure during collection, since their deployment allow
users to be aware of collection practices beforehand of actually revealing information.
Obfuscation and anonymity can be used to prevent that data, when accessed, gives away
sensitive information, e.g. by not revealing the identity of the data owner or disclosing
his location with granularity “city” instead of “building”. For secondary use, we con-
sider the specification and negotiation of obligations as a preventative mechanism, and
their enforcement, by the enterprise recipient, an avoidance measure. By ensuring that
the service, recipient of the data, is able to enforce a binding agreement on a set of obli-
gations, misuses after initial collection can be avoided. Furthermore, it is also important
to implement mechanisms for providing feedback and notify users of issues related to
previous exchanges of data. With respect to detection measures, common mechanisms
are data logs and legal audits. Additionally, in our work we introduce the use of notifi-
cations to actively monitor the ongoing state of disclosed data.
2.1 Related Work
There exist several known approaches to privacy but so far none of them have addressed
privacy as we do. Our goal is to enable a normal, common user to control privacy
by himself, in terms of managing functionalities for access control, usage control, ob-
fuscation, awareness, feedback as well as detection. We exclude in our model only
anonymity, due to the fact that it is not applicable to the kind of personalized services
considered.
P3P is probably the best-known approach to privacy policies [P3P02]. It has been
developed at the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which standardized the Platform
for Privacy Preferences in 2002. P3P enables web sites to encode its data collection
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and data use practices in a machine-readable XML format, known as a P3P policy. In
other words P3P provides a declaration format to announce data collection practices and
make a user aware of the service privacy policy. Nevertheless, the current P3P standard
only provides a mechanism to publish service side privacy policies but the enforce-
ment of such policy and thus, ensure that the web site acts according to its stated policy
is beyond the scope of P3P [Dek07]. Thus, P3P falls into the category of awareness
measures instead of measures for access control. The Platform for Enterprise Privacy
Practices (E-P3P), introduced in 2002 by Karjoth [KS02b], addressed exactly this prob-
lem. E-P3P defines an enterprise privacy enforcement system for the enforcement of
enterprise-internal privacy policies. This enables for instance, to internally enforce the
E-P3P privacy policies while promising a P3P statement to its customers.
However, as stated in [Cue02], P3P has not been tailored to the specific requirements
of pervasive applications. PawS, a Privacy Awareness System for ubiquitous computing
developed by Langheinrich [Lan02], extends P3P to cover aspects of pervasive applica-
tions. In PawS when a user enters an environment in which services are collecting data,
a privacy beacon announces privacy policies of each service. A user’s privacy proxy
then compares these policies against the user’s own privacy preferences, which can be
written using APPEL [APP02]. If the policies match, services are allowed to collect
information and users can utilize the services in return. If the policies do not match, the
system notifies the user, who then may choose not to use the service in question or, in
some cases, simply physically can leave the area in which the collection of information
occurs. This approach provides users with avoidance and preventative measures at data
collection but it cannot be used with the type of services, e.g. “Buddy Finder”, which
may not gather context data directly from the environment but depend on external con-
text providers.
Furthermore, while APPEL provides a good starting point for expressing user pri-
vacy preferences, it cannot support the richness of expressions needed in pervasive com-
puting scenarios. In [MFD03] user requirements for a privacy policy system are detailed
with emphasis in the granularity of constraints users might want to apply to control the
distribution of their location information, e.g dynamic constraints on the location and
activity of the user and recipient. Here, rules are implemented as system components
called validators without defining a concrete implementation language, though.
EPAL [EPA03] and XACML [XACML] are two other platform-independent lan-
guages that support the definition and enforcement of privacy policies for access con-
trol, mainly oriented towards the specification of enterprises statements. In [And05]
a comparison of both languages shows that EPAL offers only a subset of the func-
tionalities of XACML. XACML has been developed for some time and has reached a
high level of standardization, but it has only started recently to take possible privacy
constraints on information management into account. It may be enough for enterprise
privacy control but it still lacks of some important features to specify personal privacy
policies.
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The mentioned works are focused mainly on providing enterprises with the means
to enforce and publish their privacy policies. A different approach, oriented to the end-
user is the Confab toolkit, where information is captured, stored, and processed on an
end-user’s device [HoL04]. This gives end-users a great level of control and choice over
what personal information is disclosed but falls short in its flexibility for sharing infor-
mation in pervasive computing, since it requires the information being captured and
exchanged only between devices which hold the Confab system. The authors introduce
a privacy sensitive architecture divided into three orthogonal layers: the physical/sensor
layer, which is responsible for initially capturing personal information; the infrastruc-
ture layer, which is responsible for storing and processing personal information; and the
presentation layer, which is responsible for providing user interfaces to give end-users
control and feedback over their information. In the Confab architecture an initial step
was given in the direction of integrating different privacy measures. It provides access
control, feedback and a basic implementation of usage control. Confab introduces the
privacy tag in an initiative to integrate usage control; it provides hints on how the data
disclosed should be used outside of the user’s direct control.
In the context of usage control obligations has been introduced as requirements that
must be agreed on by obligation subjects (recipient of the data), before authorizing the
access to the data. Obligations can be seen as a binding statement to take some course
of action in the future by the obligation subject [KFJ03]. They are crucial to restrict the
flow and use of personal data in the highly dynamic distributed environments assumed
in pervasive computing. Nevertheless, in many policy systems obligations have been
defined tightly coupled to the enforcement of access control policies and in general
they cannot be used for usage control. This is the approach followed by EPAL [EPA03]
and XACML [XACML]. Within these access control languages obligations are a set of
operations associated with a policy that must be executed by the Policy Enforcement
Point together with an authorization decision before allowing the access to the data.
In the work of Park and Sandhu [PaS04] obligations are requirements that have to be
fulfilled by a subject at the time of the request for allowing access to a resource. E.g., a
user must give his name and email address to download a company’s white paper.
As an extension to XACML, the work presented in [MCC07], introduce a new ap-
proach to archive digital signed commitments on obligations between distributed par-
ties. They present the Obligation of Trust (OoT) protocol, which executes two consec-
utive steps: Notification of Obligation and Signed Acceptance of Obligation. The OoT
is built upon the XACML standard following its Web Services Profile (WS-XACML)
to address the integration of usage control measures. The disadvantages of this work
are that it does not cater for the enforcement and monitoring of such obligations, on
the one hand, and that it seems to be rather complicated for a common user to manage
obligations following this protocol, on the other hand.
In the proposal, released by the Internet Engineering Task Force Working Group
on Geoprivacy (Geopriv) [STM07], an authorization policy language for controlling
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Figure 2: Main characteristics of our Privacy Enforcement Model
access to location information is detailed. Although this schema is not designed to cover
individual privacy preferences, it has the advantage that it supports the obfuscation of a
user location by defining the accuracy with which the data should be revealed.
Summing up, users always need to actively apply prevention throughout the whole
data lifecycle. They require also mechanisms for detection and privacy enforcement by
enterprise privacy frameworks for avoidance. When comparing existing related work
with the privacy design space we use in our work, no privacy system is able to integrate
all preventative mechanisms during collection, access and secondary use. Some policy
languages tackle the idea of obfuscation, e.g., Geopriv; others include hints on how the
data should be used, e.g. Confab. Related work on the side of the enterprise, such as
E-P3P, XACML or EPAL, provide part but not all of the desired functionality. Thus,
none of today’s approaches is able to address the integration of personal privacy and
enterprise privacy as two different but complementary aspects of privacy protection.
3 Our Privacy Enforcement Model
For addressing the integration of personal privacy and enterprise privacy enforcement,
we developed a three-tier privacy enforcement model, shown in Figure 2. It serves as
basis for the specification of the involved entities and their relationships. Its main feature
is that it integrates measures for addressing prevention, avoidance and detection during
the data lifecycle. Thus, it covers the privacy design space described in Section 2. The
privacy enforcement model consists of the following three pillars:
1. Data Collector: This pillar provides abstractions for representing any data collector
as typical source of context information. We classify them into two groups: i) the
group of data collectors under direct control of a user, for example, a GPS tracking
device. In general, they are sources of personal context that do not represent a
privacy risk, per se; ii) data collectors that are operated by enterprises, e.g. mobile
network operators. Langheinrich addressed in his work the privacy implications of
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those kinds of data collectors and provided a Privacy Awareness System (PawS) to
help individuals deal with them. In our model we assume that a similar framework
to PawS [Lan02] is in place to handle them.
2. Trusted Privacy Manager: This central pillar provides abstraction for a personal
and trusted privacy enforcement system. The role of the Trusted Privacy Manager
is to orchestrate any disclosure of personal data and to manage the collaboration
between entities with the goal to protect an individual’s privacy. Thus, it must pro-
vide functionality for the evaluation of service-side privacy policies (data collectors
and data consumers), the enforcement of its users’ privacy policies, for guiding the
negotiation of agreements on secondary use, and facilitating the monitoring of dis-
closed data.
3. Data Consumer: The last pillar represents abstractions for data consumers, in par-
ticular consumers of context information that depend on external data collectors to
implement their respective services, e.g a “Restaurant Finder” or a “Buddy Finder”
service. Obviously, these are the main types of emerging services in pervasive com-
puting. However, context providers and service providers are typically decoupled
and operate independently from each other and, thus, must be orchestrated.
Our privacy enforcement model is built around direct, one-to-one binding agree-
ments between the Trusted Privacy Manager and the other two pillars. The Trusted Pri-
vacy Manager acts as mediator between data collectors and data consumers. It reduces
and simplifies potentially complex relationships between them to contractual two-party
agreements. It avoids direct exchange of data between data collectors and data con-
sumers. The idea behind the use of agreements is twofold: to specify authorized actions
and usage purposes and to avoid uncontrolled disclosures among data collectors and
consumers.
We have defined three levels of collaboration to enable the integration of personal
and enterprise privacy enforcement, as it is shown in Figure 2, namely: Bilateral Privacy
Access Control, Obligations Negotiation and Management, and Obligations Tracking.
They are complementary and depend on each other.
The first level of collaboration (Bilateral Privacy Access Control) demands from
each party to include privacy-aware access control mechanisms. Note that, only in the
case of the Trusted Privacy Manager access control should be context-aware. Since, it is
the only tier that is allowed to have direct access to users’ context data. Bilateral access
control means, for us, that both, the service side privacy policy and the user’s privacy
policy (data owner) are evaluated beforehand of any disclosure. How this is achieved
may differ from case to case.
The second level, the Obligations Negotiation and Management, requires from all
three pillars to adopt a common model for the specification of obligations and trust that
data collectors and data consumers will handle personal data according to such obliga-
tions. The third level Obligations Tracking was introduced as an initial measure for trust
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management and to allow lifecycle awareness of the data. Our approach to establish a
trusted relationship between an enterprise service and the Trusted Privacy Manager is
based on the possibility to subscribe to notifications about the use of disclosed data.
In the collaboration of the Data Collector pillar with other parts of the system, as it
was mentioned already, we rely on the idea elaborated by Langheinrich. There, PawS
allows data collectors to describe their collection policies in a machine-readable format
and communicate them to their data subjects. If the user agrees the services can collect
information and users can utilize the services. Thus, we can assume that a user is noti-
fied, via a Trusted Privacy Manager, before a new data collection is started, (e.g. video
surveillance or indoor security tracking). The user then can check the service’s privacy
policy and either agrees to or denies the collection. Due to the implicit nature of this
type of data collectors, a user in general can only accept or reject the collection of the
data in a “take or (physically) leave” fashion.
For the Data Consumer, we assume that any consumer service first has to register
with an instance of the Trusted Privacy Manager. Upon registration the service discloses
its privacy policy. The policy (e.g. P3P) shall have at least the following elements: data
consumer description, data elements the service requests, and purpose of the request. If
the registration is successful, the Trusted Privacy Manager agrees on providing context
broker functionality for the subscribed service. From this moment on and for each ser-
vice request, a Trusted Privacy Manager entity evaluates its users’ privacy policies to
decide whether or not the request is granted. Thereby, bilateral privacy access control
is enforced. The data is transmitted only if all the restrictions and conditions defined
by the user are fulfilled. This avoids unwanted “take or leave situations” in interactions
with Data Consumers.
However, bilateral privacy access control only addresses situations where informa-
tion is disclosed for the present use. It only provides preventative and avoidance mea-
sures during collection and access. Thus, it does not cover cases where information
may be stored for future use or even be sold in a potentially different situation. Here
is where the second and third collaboration levels come into play. They introduce ad-
ditional mechanisms for detection and secondary use control. As a result, our privacy
model demands from enterprise services (data collector and data consumers) not only
to apply access control, but also to actively accept and enforce obligations on behalf
of the user. This notion of obligations enforcement is in accordance with the work of
Casassa et al. [CAT06], where obligations are first class entities enforced by enterprises
to comply with current legislation and enterprise guidelines. Obligations are comple-
mented in our model by an agreement negotiation protocol plus notification mechanism
to enhance a user’s confidence in privacy enforcement by enterprises.
Our model assumes that the enterprise service agrees on taking over the task of
protecting users’ data by truthfully fulfilling the negotiated obligations. Once the data
is disclosed the Trusted Privacy Manager can be configured to remain in a stand-by
monitoring mode. Of course, trustworthiness forms an integral part of this model for
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Figure 3: Requirements for Personal Privacy Protection
the reason that releasing personal information to a third party requires the trust that the
receiving party will treat the information only in the agreed manner. However, the same
happens in our daily life, where we trust our peers to keep confidential information
to themselves. The application of known social patters, such as individual’s trust on
collaborations of a contractual nature (agreements) and on enterprises’ reputation, will
make it easier for users to understand privacy control and generates more willingness
to manage their privacy actively.
4 A Trusted Privacy Manager
In this section we present the principles and requirements that a Trusted Privacy Man-
ager should realize. As research on personal privacy protection in pervasive computing
is a rather novel topic, an important result of our work was the identification of the
requirements that a Trusted Privacy Manager need to address. Figure 3 shows those
requirements grouped together into three subsets. During their definition our goal was
to keep the balance between Privacy Protection and the two other key success factors
Service Usability and User Manageability. We want to provide non-expert users with
the means to control privacy but without forgetting the main reason for all this; users
need privacy protection because they want to use the offered services.
Our first design principle, Privacy Protection, addresses the definition and enforce-
ment of users’ privacy preferences for the whole data lifecycle. The second design prin-
ciple, Service Usability, is focused on providing “fair” interactions. The idea behind is
to avoid that once a user starts using a service the interaction flow is terminated because
the user denies the access to his data. One of our main contributions here was, to make
the enforcement of a user privacy policy directly dependent on the context in which a
service request, as data collector, was made and whether or not a user has previously
requested the service.
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The third key principle is related with how to enable common users to manage
privacy on their own. User Manageability requires, among others issues, to limit the
number of parameters that a user needs to configure. A mistake would be to overwhelm
users with the burdensome task of creating and managing privacy (further information
can be found in Section 5.3). In general, simplicity and user-friendliness lead to the loss
of flexibility and expressiveness, e.g. in the number and type of restrictions the user can
understand, but also to an increase in manageability.
The tradeoffs are that the more privacy protection is desired, the less service usabil-
ity and user manageability can be achieved, and vice versa. On the other hand, service
usability and user manageability may influence each other positively; by improving ser-
vice usability, we may enhance user manageability in the context of privacy awareness.
Users want to receive feedback from the services with respect to the use of disclosed
data. That requires from services to collaborate with respect to the enforcement of obli-
gations and exchange of notifications, as described in Section 5.2.
Before detailing our reference implementation of a Trusted Privacy Manager, next
we outline the mentioned requirements, which have guided the overall design of our
privacy framework for keeping the mentioned three principles balanced.
4.1 Principles and Requirements
i) Privacy Protection: the realization of this principle involves five design requirements
to be implemented.
1. User-centric: The first principle of the OECD guidelines for Data Collection
[OECD], called “Collection Limitation”, states that sensitive data should be
obtained by lawful and fair means and with the consent of the data subject.
Therefore, individuals need mechanisms to define under which circumstances
data should be disclosed. In order to offer a controlled distribution of sensi-
tive personal data and spare individuals from spending time on setting their
privacy preferences for each encountered service separately, the collection and
distribution of users’ personal data should be centralized.
2. Privacy-aware Access Control: As a corollary to the previous one, this require-
ment states that the system shall provide appropriate access control mecha-
nisms for allowing the specification and enforcement of user privacy policies
during collection and thereby restricting the “when, what, how, and who” of
accessing personal data.
3. Context Awareness: Recent studies on the perception of privacy [AHK07] by
individuals concluded that user preferences vary depending on place and social
context. Thus, privacy policies should be made context-aware. In addition to
the typical restrictions on the recipient or on the purpose of the data collec-
tion, dynamic constraints related to a user’s environmental context should be
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possible. Most attributes that describe an individual and the environment are
dynamic context, e.g. location, time, temperature, blood pressure, activity, etc.
4. Trustworthiness: Trust was defined by e.g. Luhmann in 1968 as “a mecha-
nism to reduce social complexity” [LUH79]. Privacy enforcement needs to trust
the involved parties in that they will fulfill their duties with respect to privacy
protection. Furthermore, the enforcement of context-aware policies entails the
disclosure of sensitive information during the policy evaluation (e.g. location,
activity, calendar), which raises the requirement of a new actor, a so-called
Trusted Privacy Manager, in charge of evaluating personal privacy policies and
coordinating the duties that untrusted parties shall adhere to.
5. Disclosure Level Control: As it was mentioned in Section 2 there is a need
for preventative mechanisms during data access. Data obfuscation measures
should be provided to control the precision of the information to be disclosed,
allowing fine-grained control over the quality of data transmitted. This require-
ment was already introduced by Hong et al. in [HoL04] and mentioned in “Data
Quality Principle” of the OECD guidelines.
ii) Service Usability: the realization of this principle added four extra requirements to
our design.
6. Usage Control: Usage control extends access control and encompasses all those
mechanisms that deal with future uses of the data disclosed and with the detec-
tion of privacy violations. This requirement has two aspects: to ensure privacy
protection and at the same time service usability. For a user it is important
to delimit what a recipient of his data is allowed to do, also stipulated by the
OECD as “Use Limitation Principle”. From the point of view of an enterprise it
is mandatory to enforce user preferences in order to follow existing privacy leg-
islation. The alignment of both will increase the confidence into and promote
the further deployment of CAMS [SSA06].
7. Cooperative Privacy Protection: Pervasive privacy is only feasible if all en-
tities involved in the exchange of personal information collaborate with each
other on the enforcement of the user’s privacy preferences. As the OECD “Ac-
countability Principle” states, any data consumer should be accountable for
complying with measures for the protection of such data. The enforcement of
personal privacy and enterprise privacy both requires a new privacy enforce-
ment model to formalize such collaboration as described in Section 3.
8. Flexibility: Obviously, the interaction with different data collectors and data
consumers requires a flexible and distributed architecture, as described in Sec-
tion 5.2.2, and some awareness of the underlying semantics. This recommends
the use of a semantic representation model for privacy policies and context
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data, which provide a common reference for the collaboration of the different
entities involved.
9. Fairness: The system should enable “fair” communication following the “Fair
Information Trade” principle. The realization of this principle gives another
perspective on privacy control, where information is disclosed as “payment”
for the service. [EHG07].
iii) User Manageability: the realization of this principle will enable non-expert users
to manage privacy.
10. User Friendliness: There is a strong requirement for a common, easy-to-use
interface for giving a user the possibility of managing his privacy. This is a
common requirement often mentioned, although at present no implementation
is available and also reference work such as The Faces Metaphor [LMD03] was
discontinued.
11. Awareness of Privacy Status: “Openness”, a principle of the OECD guide-
lines, tries to guaranty that users are aware of all the issues related to personal
data. The increase of information flow back to the data owners is related with
measures for avoidance and detection during data access and secondary use.
People should be provided with means to access information related with the
disclosure and use of his data.
12. White Lying: By definition, pervasive computing environments are supposed
to be largely automated and “always on”. In a certain sense it follows that peo-
ple do not have the possibility to “switch-off” the system. We introduce the
requirement of adapting the concept of white lies as a way to “disconnect”
individuals temporarily from a pervasive computing environment in a plausi-
ble way and maintain standard social interaction patterns, our approach to the
integration of white lies is described in [WLI07].
5 User-Centric Privacy Framework
Our reference implementation of a Trusted Privacy Manager entity is called “User-
centric Privacy Framework” (UCPF). The remainder of this section is dedicated to the
description of the key elements of the UCPF and its functional decomposition into
services as being installable on a residential gateway for our Smart Home [AZF07] lab.
The Smart Home in general provides an ideal target environment to deploy and test
a privacy enforcement system for a controlled and small number of users. It naturally
meets the requirements of being User-centric and Trustworthy. The residential gateway
enables access to home-based services from inside and outside the home environment.
The incorporation of the UCPF adds privacy control and context brokering as separate
functionalities and allows inhabitants to interact with external CAMS. Part of our work,
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Figure 4: User-centric Privacy Framework Architecture Overview
on its design, was also used in the privacy context manager system of the IST project
CONNECT [AME07].
The UCPF architecture has been designed according to the requirements identified
in the previous section. Figure 4 shows a high-level view on the global architecture. A
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) framework hosts all UCPF components, except
for the Sentry Registry. For our implementation we used the Knopflerfish OSGi Service
Platform [Knopf]. OSGi defines a standardized component-oriented environment for
networked services and handles the typical service management tasks.
The UCPF consists of five core services implemented as bundles within the OSGi
framework namely, the Sentry, the System Manager Interface (SMI), the Context Han-
dler (CH), the Obligation Manager (OM), and the Noise Module (NM). Apart from
them, the UCPF incorporates a web registry (Sentry Registry) and a graphical interface
for the user, named the Privacy Manager Interface.
In the following sections, we describe how the three core design principles of our
model are mapped to the functional specification of each of the UCPF components.
5.1 Providing Privacy Protection
The most fundamental goal of a Trusted Privacy Manager is to enable personal privacy
protection. The realization of this principle involves, as was detailed in Section 4.1, five
requirements to be implemented, namely: User-centric, Privacy-aware Access Control,
Context Awareness, Trustworthiness, and Disclosure Level Control. In other words, we
need a privacy proxy responsible of taking care of privacy-related data, when being
accessed from any data consumer. This privacy proxy should control the dissemination
of data within the interaction chain as shown in Figure 6, based on a set of context-aware
privacy policies defined by the user.
For illustrating the functionalities of such a privacy proxy we first consider a typical
interaction chain between a user and a context consumer (e.g. a CAMS, c.f. Figure 5).
354 Bagues S.A., Zeidler A., Klein C., Valdivielso C.F., Matias I.R.: Enabling ...
Figure 5: Typical Interaction Chain
Figure 6: Protected Interaction Chain
The data flow along that interaction chain involves different autonomous entities like
people, companies or organizations who typically adopt one specific role at a time.
We distinguish the following general roles: i) A “Target” is the tracked individual; ii)
The “Service Provider” (data consumer) compiles context information for its users; iii)
The “Recipient” (one or many) is the user of the service; iv) The “Context Provider”
(data collector) acts as an intermediate entity, responsible for collecting, caching and
managing of context information and for disseminating it, accordingly.
It is obvious that potentially malicious third parties can take advantage of this com-
pletely open interaction setting. Except for the target itself, all other entities along the
interaction chain are classified as untrusted, since they are not under the direct control
of the user. Even if a contractual relationship exists between the entities (e.g. between
a user and a mobile operator) we consider this not to be enough for completely trusting
such third-party services with the enforcement of context-aware privacy policies. There-
fore, we introduced the Sentry, as our privacy proxy within the UCPF, for taking-over a
new role in the interaction chain (see Figure 6). It constitutes a trusted personal privacy
enforcement point that controls all accesses to privacy-relevant data of its users and
meets our requirements of being User-centric and providing Trustworthiness. A Sen-
try’s main purpose is to free a user from manually consenting or dissenting to privacy
statements as they commonly need to do in today’s Internet services.
Other UCPF functional components needed to implement Privacy Protection a part
from the Sentry are the Context Handler (CH) and the Noise Module (NM). Figure 7
shows a typical interaction sequence between those components triggered by a CAMS
request. For the sake of simplicity, in this first example, we left out the negotiation
of agreements, which is detailed in the following section. It is important to note that
the Sentry as specified by the UCPF is acting as a fac¸ade implementation for privacy
protection.
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Figure 7: Interaction Sequence in the UCPF
5.1.1 Sentry
Sentry is the major architectural building block of the UCPF. It is build around the core
elements of a policy distribution architecture as defined in the RFC2753 acting as Policy
Decision Point (PDP), and Policy Enforcement Point (PET). It meets our requirement
of providing Privacy-aware Access Control. The communication between a CAMS and
the UCPF services is realized by the Sentry’s PEP component implementing an Inter-
ceptor pattern on messages passing through the system. Figure 8 shows the template
used to create the request- response-messages exchanged between a CAMS and a Sen-
try instance. Once the PEP gets a request message and after validating it, the message
is forwarded to the PDP. When the PDP gets an evaluation message from the PEP, it
imports its user policies into the rule engine and triggers its execution. The policy lan-
guage and the policy evaluation algorithm used are presented in [AZV07] . Once the
process finalizes the PEP compiles the message to be returned to the service.
5.1.2 Context Handler
The Context Handler (CH) provides access control to the system repositories and acts
as a mediator between the Sentry and external context collectors. It also manages the
semantic models used to represent policies and context data in the system. The CH has
two main elements: the Policy Administration Point (PAP), which basically is used to
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Figure 8: Request and Response Message Template
add, edit and delete policies from the repository, and the Data Handler (DH) respon-
sible for the identification of external sources of context and make the UCPF Context
Awareness. The DH also handles the access to the data repositories, e.g. to validate a
request.
In our work, we mostly focus on interactions between the UCPF, as a Trusted Pri-
vacy Manager, and data consumer entities. In our model specification we just outlined
how interactions with data collectors should take place to maintain the required level
of personal privacy. However, we need to assume that there exists a context broker, e.g.
as the one described in [AME07], able to gather context from existing data collectors
and from which the DH can obtain context data. How that context broker is imple-
mented and how it gathers data from different data collectors (as context providers) is
considered to be out of the scope of this article.
The ideal situation is to extend the implementation of the UCPF to include a Trusted
Context Broker (TCB) as part of its service architecture, though. It only should man-
age context data of the users of a single Sentry instance and be only accessible by the
CH. The TCB is supposed to collect information from context providers, as a mobile
operator, a GPS device or from a calendar application, and guarantee that the flow of in-
formation is unidirectional: Context Provider→ TCB→ CH . This assumption is based
on the OMA Privacy Requirements [OMA07], which state that mobile operators must
provide tools for specifying to which parties personal information may be forwarded.
We suppose that all data collectors can be configured to only forward information to a
TCB.
5.1.3 Noise Module
The Noise Module (NM) is a modular functional component that injects additional
information into the policy matching mechanism for altering the data. Currently are
implemented different levels of obfuscation, named Transformations, within the Local
Transformation Point (LTP) and a Virtual Context generator within the White Lying
Generator (WLG).
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We define Transformations as any process that the user, as target, may define on a
specific piece of context information to decrease its accuracy or granularity. The LTP is
basically a set of different processes (Transformations), which are invoked by the Sen-
try before releasing the data. They are used to implement the requirement of allowing
Disclosure Level Control. For instance, location information disclosed with accuracy
equal to “area level”, what means that information about the street and building, should
be hidden from the recipient.
Also, we have developed a novel mechanism for privacy protection, which addresses
the question: How can people temporarily “disconnect” from a “always-on” pervasive
computing environment in a plausible way? Users can disclose a Virtual Context (as
“white lie”) instead of the real data. A Virtual Context is generated by the WLG based
on a set of parameters and a visibility algorithm. Consequentially, we allow users to
hide their location, their activity, etc., from others, without simply denying the access.
More details are given in [WLI07].
5.2 Providing Service Usability
Service Usability is the second principle that guided the design of our framework. It
is related with how interactions, within the protected interaction chain of Figure 6, are
modeled. Service Usability involves the implementation of four of our requirements for
personal privacy enforcement, namely: Usage Control, Cooperative Privacy Protec-
tion, Fairness and Flexibility. The purpose of implementing this principle is fourfold:
i) to specify how interactions between the UCPF and a CAMS take place; ii) to define
how collaborations are established between parties; iii) to enable the enforcement of
user privacy preferences on secondary use by enterprises; iv) to make communications
“fair”.
In this section we first introduce the Sentry Registry component, key element to
enable interactions between Sentry instances and CAMS. After that, we illustrate how
functionalities are distributed by introducing our service deployment model.
5.2.1 Sentry Registry
The Sentry Registry is the only component that is not co-located with the rest of the
elements in the gateway. This component is shared among Sentries and is hosted in
the Internet. It tracks the availability of people’s context and provides the pointer to
the appropriate Sentry service instance. Services, organizations and Sentries need to be
registered with the UCPF before starting any context request, which is done in the Sen-
try Registry. The Sentry Registry has an important role in making interactions possible
between CAMS and Sentries, and also between different Sentry instances, providing
Flexibility to deal with distributed and changing entities. Therefore, the main function-
alities of the Sentry Registry component are:
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Figure 9: Template Registration Request and Response Message
Figure 10: Template Find Sentry Request and Response Message
– Sentry Publisher: In order to make context data of the UCPF’s users available to
third-parties (CAMS and external Sentries), the Sentry Registry provides an inter-
face to publish instances of Sentries detailing its users, context available and web
service URL.
– Service Consumer Register: The Sentry Registry exposes an interface, which is
used by external services to register themselves. Upon registration, an enterprise
should disclose its privacy policy (e.g. with P3P). The registration is successful if
the purpose, the data collected and the type of service are in the range of allowed
values and the enterprise policy system is able to enforce obligations.
– Organization Register: We consider organizations as entities with a contractual re-
lationship with one or more users of the UCPF. An organization may require, based
on a contract agreed-on by a user, to constraint the disclosure of its clients’ con-
text data (e.g. employees). The Sentry Registry provides a web service interface to
allow enterprises to define Organization Policies for UCPF’s users.
– Sentry Discovery Service: The Sentry Register offers the possibility of discovering
the availability of people’s context. In response to a find request message, it returns
the URL of the appropriate Sentry service instance. The Sentry Registry supports
two types of queries, either by Sentry Name (Bob@Sentry08) which identifies
the Sentry instance and its user, or by User, detailing his name and address, as is
shown in the find-request message of Figure 10.
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Figure 11: Deployment Model
Once an entity is registered, the messages exchange between Sentry Registry and
Sentry are encrypted, for message confidentiality and to avoid identity theft. During
the registration process each entity receives a UUID, used to identify them uniquely
within the UCPF. The exchange of keys, used to encrypt and decrypt messages, must
take place during registration, see Figure 9. The request-message includes the public
key used by the Sentry Registry to encrypt the response-message. It contains the secret
key to be used to encrypt and decrypt subsequent messages. We use asymmetric-key
cryptography only to facilitate the distribution of secret keys. The use of symmetric
cryptography in the rest of interactions provides better performance during the process
of writing and reading messages.
5.2.2 Service Deployment Model
The service deployment model of Figure 11 shows how the different parts are dis-
tributed. In the “trusted area” are the Sentry Registry, located on the Internet and the
instances of Sentries, Bob@Sentry08 and Alice@Sentry02, which we assume
are deployed on a gateway, e.g. in a smart home. A Sentry is deployed together with
at least the following services: Context Handler, Noise Module, and Trusted Context
Broker, as being described in the previous section. In the “untrusted area” are CAMS
and Mobile Users.
In order to better explain the interactions taking place, steps 1 to 10 in Figure 11,
we use the example of a “Buddy Finder” service. Alice first starts the “Buddy Finder”
application on her mobile device. The “Buddy Finder” service then gets a request from
Alice to compile the location of all the members on her contact list, among them also
Bob (step 1). We suppose that Bob has set up his Sentry with a rule to allow the access
from his group Friends to his location if they are located in the same city. When the
“Buddy Finder” gets a request to obtain the location of Bob from Alice (one of the
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members of the group Friends) it needs to know where to find Bob’s Location. Thus, it
sends a query to the Sentry Registry to get Bob@Sentry08 URL (steps 2 and 3), and
subsequently is able to request Bob’s location from the matching Sentry instance (step
4). As mentioned, Bob’s rule includes a restriction on the location of Alice, what means
that Bob@Sentry08 needs to request its CH for Alice’s location. It could happen that
the CH does not know Alice@Sentry02 and needs to get its URL from the Sentry
Registry (steps 5 and 6). Once Bob@Sentry08 gets Alice location, steps 7 and 8,
the evaluation process of the “Buddy Finder” request finishes and the “Buddy Finder”
finally can access the location of Bob (step 9), assuming that all the constraints are
fulfilled, and sends the response with Bob location to Alice (step 10).
The addition of the UCPF in the protected interaction chain modifies the way that
Mobile Users interact with CAMS. One of the implications of our model is that services
cannot expect to directly get access to context data within a user request. For instance,
in case of a “Restaurant Finder” service it is common to find that the getRestaurantList()
call contains already the location of the requester (Bob), in our schema additional inter-
actions are needed in order to get Bob’s location directly from his Sentry. The advantage
of this model is that it allows adding, e.g, a Transformation to reduce the granularity of
the information to “area level” and also to negotiate an agreement on secondary use of
the disclosed location information; or to make Bob aware of the number of disclosures
made per service. On the other hand, services need to be registered with the Sentry Reg-
istry. The registration process consists of the evaluation of the service privacy policy,
which should be publicly available.
5.2.3 Active vs. Passive Interactions with the UCPF
For Service Usability reasons and in order to make communication “fair”, active and
passive users of a service (acting as data consumer) must be distinguishable. In the
active case, the user is actively using the service and some action from the service
is requested, e.g. where to find the closest-by Italian restaurant, or where a friend is
located. Here personal data is disclosed as “payment” for the service. On the other
hand, if the user is passive, as is the case of Bob in the example of the “Buddy Finder”,
the user gets a data request without using the service.
An important feature of the UCPF is its ability to distinguish between three dif-
ferent classes of interactions (active, passive and binding) and to select the rules to be
evaluated, accordingly, thereby meeting our Fairness requirement. Making communi-
cation “fair” involves to be aware of the context in which a service request was made.
We want to avoid denying the access to user data when he, in the active role, has pre-
viously requested the service, or when he, as a “Target”, has a binding agreement with
the “Recipient”, in the role of an organization, that obliges him to disclose his data.
We classify interactions from the point of view of the “Target” if the “Target”, owner
of the data requested, is an active user the interaction is called an active interaction. In
those interactions, where the “Target” is a passive user, interactions are classified as
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passive interactions. An interaction is passive if a user receives a request from a CAMS
or an external Sentry without previously requesting the service, e.g. when a colleague
asks the “Friend Finder” application where a user currently is located, the disclosure of
his location does not necessarily involve that the user gets any benefit in return.
Within passive interactions there exists a case that requires special consideration.
When interactions are regulated with a binding contract between a user and an organi-
zation that requires from the user to disclose his data under certain circumstances. For
instance, a home-care nurse might be required to disclose her location to her employer
if her activity state is “working” for better organizing her daily calendar. We named
these interactions binding interaction.
The UCPF supports three different types of interactions: active-, passive- and bind-
ing interactions. For each of those the system provides different functionality. In ac-
tive interactions the UCPF discloses always the information requested, allowing users
only to adjust the quality level (accuracy) of the data with a Transformation. In pas-
sive interactions the default configuration of the system is to deny all accesses to all
the requesters. If a user wants to give a positive permission to one of the subscribed
services or subjects, he needs to add a new rule including conditions under which such
access should be granted. For binding interactions, the system allows the integration of
rules created by an organization with the user policies. Thus, only in case of passive
interactions a service could get a denied access to the data.
5.2.4 Active Token
The nature of a user request to any CAMS is independent of the privacy framework.
Thus, the UCPF cannot distinguish whether a user is active or a passive one. We in-
troduced the concept of an active token to indicate that a user has an active role in the
ongoing interaction. An active token is a set of data used to proof that the user has orig-
inally requested the service. This token includes always the following fields: the user
and service identifier (generated by the Sentry Registry), a timeout to allow tracking
actions for a limited period of time, and the resource type.
An active token is generated and included in each request sent by a user of the
UCPF to a CAMS. This means to assume that the service interface is modified to add
an encrypted security token (e.g.WS-Security) and that it is forwarded in a getUser-
ContextRequest() message to the appropriate Sentry. There, and before starting
the actual evaluation of the request the token is decrypted.
When a Sentry gets an active token, the token can be addressed to that Sentry itself
or a different Sentry. The addressee of the token is identified with a plain text ID. Only
if a Sentry is the final receptor, it can decrypt it. We used asymmetric cryptography to
authenticate the user@sentry and avoid that the token could be modified or forged.
In Figure 11 an active token is received by the “Friend-Finder” service and for-
warded to Bob@Sentry08. But, as it was generated by Alice, it cannot be decrypted
in
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Bob@Sentry08. The request is evaluated in the context of a passive interaction them.
The active token is forwarded to Alice@Sentry02 by the Context Handler whiting
a new getUserContextRequest(), send to get Alice’s location. In Alice@-
Sentry02 it is finally decrypted and the location of Alice is revealed to Bob@-
Sentry08. Here the request is evaluated in the context of an active interaction.
5.2.5 Usage Control and Collaboration
We introduced obligations in the UCPF to address two of our requirements, Usage Con-
trol and Cooperative Privacy Protection. Obligations are used to create automatic bind-
ings with a CAMS and ensure that data protection requirements are adhered to. Their
main functionalities are: i) to specify actions that should be performed by a service,
acting as the recipient of a user data; ii) obligations are used to automatically exchange
users’ preferences on secondary use with enterprises; iii) to enable the exchange of
notifications between Sentry instances and CAMS services; iii) to address prevention
and avoidance at secondary use and to enable detection during collection, access and
secondary use.
We created a set of predefined obligations and classified into system obligations
and negotiable obligations. Obligations play a key role in the establishment of the pri-
vacy enforcement model introduced in Section 3, thus not all obligations are negotiable.
For instance, the obligation “Data MUST NOT be disclosed to any third-party entity”,
is used to avoid direct disclosures between data collectors and data consumers. System
obligations are agreed on during the registration process, with the Sentry Registry, with-
out negotiation. They control disclosures to third-party services, monitor changes on the
service privacy policy and enable the access to collected data and data logs. They re-
flect current privacy legislation and must be established beforehand of any commercial
transaction with a service.
Negotiable obligations represent those constraints that a user may impose on an
enterprise service at disclosure time. In our definition, they have two aspects: first, it is
a second-class entity subject to the enforcement of a rule by the Sentry. And second,
when an rule evaluation reaches the Sentry’s PEP and it contains obligations, these
obligations are not enforced but activate a negotiation protocol. Then, obligations are
first-class entities used to exchange personal privacy preferences with an enterprise.
Negotiable obligations are used to control the information disclosed among users of a
particular CAMS, authorized purposes, number of accesses and retention time of user’s
data.
In the representation of obligations basically we follow the schema adopted by the
Obligation Management System of Casassa Mont to facilitate collaboration with the
enterprise privacy system. Obligations in the UCPF are XML documents with Event,
Action, Notification and Metadata elements. Figure 12 shows the template followed to-
gether with an XML instance. An obligation is activated at the moment that its Event oc-
curs. Once an obligation is activated, and its event parameters are true, its execution has
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Figure 12: Obligation Template and XML Example
two effects: i) an action must be performed, specified with the property ActionType,
ii) a notification must be sent to a Sentry instance. For that, the notification tag was
added in the definition of the UCPF obligations. The type of notification that needs to
be compiled is identified by the NotificationType property. Thus, the enforce-
ment of an obligation in our model follows the sequence Event-Action-Notification,
instead of an Event-Action used by previous approaches.
We assume in our model that the set of predefined obligations are common and
known for all data collectors and data consumers; they do not need to be exchanged in
each negotiation. We wrapped obligations in an agreement document, shown in Figure
14, where only the parameters of such obligations are exchanged. The agreement ne-
gotiation protocol defined in our model starts after the policy evaluation of a service
request within a Sentry instance concludes. If the rule effect compiled contains obliga-
tions, the PEP queries the OM for an agreement over the pending obligations, step 1
in Figure 13. Then, if there is not a previous agreement, the OM returns the agreement
to be negotiated, step 2. The Sentry launches the negotiation, steps 3 to 14, which is
repeated at most for three rounds.
However, in many cases such agreements cannot be checked and thus to confirm the
compliance with the obligation is almost impossible. The concept of non-observable
obligations is described in [HBP05]. Hilty et al. suggest that a possible solution is the
use of non-technical means, such as audits or legislation. We additionally propose the
idea of employing observable bindings. This is realized by introducing a notification
mechanism together with an agreement negotiation protocol, based on the exchange of
messages about the whereabouts and use of data. The enforcement of obligations and
the exchange of notifications provide the UCPF with tools to meet the requirements of
Usage Control and Cooperative Privacy Protection.
The Obligation Manager is the only component that deals with obligations, agree-
ments and notifications. It consists of the Obligation Handler and the Obligation Moni-
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Figure 13: Agreement Negotiation Protocol Sketch
tor elements. The first is in charge of creating agreements and the negotiation of selected
obligations. The Obligation Monitor monitors the state of obligations based on notifica-
tions and data logs. It also compiles notifications to be sent by the Sentry to the service,
which can just confirm a received notification, request a data log, or inform of an oc-
curred violation including sanctions to be carried out, e.g. unregistering the service.
More information about the management of obligations in the UCPF can be found in
[AZF08].
5.3 Providing User Manageability
A main goal of the UCPF is to allow non-expert users to specify their privacy criteria
in an easy-to-use fashion by applications like our Privacy Manager Interface. This in-
cludes the definition of constrains on data collection, the desired obfuscation level and
obligations to be negotiated, as well as providing interfaces for awareness and feed-
back. The core idea of our third design principle, User Manageability, is then to allow
common users to manage privacy. But due to the lack of general knowledge of individ-
uals of how to deal with privacy issues and the intrinsic complexity of semantic policy
languages, the task of designing appropriate user interfaces is not trivial.
We analyzed how users can understand and thereby manage the privacy concepts
implemented in our framework. As a first step, we addressed the following issues: How
can a user understand the concept of privacy policies for passive and active interactions?
How can a user specify restrictions on context data of him or even on the recipient con-
text? How may a user still apply plausible deniability in pervasive computing? How can
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Figure 14: Agreement and Notification Template
he deal with organization policies? How can a user negotiate obligations on secondary
use or set up the granularity level of information to be disclosed? Based on our analysis
we designed in a second step a set of applications, which constitute our current version
of the Privacy Manager Interface. The third step is to test our user interface, the Pri-
vacy Manager Interface, with a focus group of users and evaluate this against our initial
questions.
We have developed the Privacy Manager Interface based on simple window-based
control elements such as list, buttons, etc. Our goal was not to develop a new graphical
environment to manage privacy. In [BRS05], studies showed that most users still prefer
to use conventional interfaces, 24 out of 34 participants selected a “traditional” browser
interface rather than a more sophisticated “Virtual City”. We believe that users need to
learn how to manage privacy prior to introducing “fancy” interfaces. It is more impor-
tant to provide easy-to-use concepts for describing and managing privacy together. Our
framework, we describe here, obviously can be accessed by all kinds of different GUIs
(e.g. such Virtual City) later.
5.4 Privacy Manager Interface
The Privacy Manager interface incorporates a set of application parts designed espe-
cially to meet the requirements of User Friendliness and Privacy Awareness. Our first
prototype allows to: i) customize permissions for the disclosure of users’ personal data,
ii) control active and passive interactions with services, iii) define obligations to be
negotiated on the usage of the data upon transmission, iv) be aware of privacy related
issues such as granted and denied permissions, v) apply alternative privacy mechanisms
to access control, as white lying and obfuscation, vi) adhere to enterprise privacy poli-
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Figure 15: Access and Home Windows
cies based on a contractual relationship with an enterprise or organization.
The access screen, shown on the left hand side in Figure 15, is the first window that
users find after starting the Privacy Manager Interface. This window is used to login but
also to register a new user of the system. Once a user is registered, he or she can access
the offered applications, by just introducing “username” and “password”. The button
“login” takes a user to the next window, the “Home” window. The “Home” window,
shown on the right hand side in Figure 15, displays six different options to manage
personal privacy. Two of them, the “White Lying” and “Organization Policies” are al-
ready designed but under development at the moment of writing this article. The other
four: “Customize your Permissions”, “Customize your Services”, “Privacy State”, and
“Obligations” are being tested by targeted users. Each of the applications is presented
including a picture and a brief explanation to help users to understand the functionality
of the application.
Customizing your Permissions. The first selectable option, depicted at the upper
left corner of the home screen, is the application that allows users to manage positive
permissions. A special feature of the “Customize your Permissions” application, shown
in Figure 16, is that it provides a default configuration for all its users, even if a user
does not introduce any rule at all, the user is still protected, the system returns always
a “deny” value. A user only needs to create positive permissions to deal with passive
interactions. With this application a user can add new permissions, by using a set of
four different constraints: on the recipient, on the user context, on the recipient context,
and on the accuracy of the data. A user can also check, update and delete those rules
previously created. It provides also a special tool to manage contact groups, which can
be used to group individuals into roles.
Customizing your Services. The second option to create personal policies is the
application “Customize your Services”, depicted at the upper right corner of the home
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Figure 16: Screen Shots of the Customize your Permissions Application
Figure 17: Customize Services and Privacy Status Application Screens
screen. This application is used only for active interactions. Here users just need to
configure the granularity of each resource for each of the registered services, see the
screen shown on the right hand side in Figure 17. Theses rules do not include other
type of constraints. As a result, if one of the rules is enforced, the service always gets a
positive permission. Since, the rule only controls the applicable transformation.
Privacy Status Application. The application “Privacy Status” was created to meet
the system requirement of Awareness of users’ privacy status. The application should
display all the information related to privacy issues. In the current version (left hand side
on Figure 17), it lists granted and denied permissions sorted by date, and allows to check
enforced rules. In the future, it will provide functionalities to track existing agreements
on obligation sets, check the state of unfulfilled obligations, and monitor notifications
sent to and received from a service. We would like also to extend this application by
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Figure 18: Obligation Application
incorporating alarms on potential privacy risk and check enterprises privacy policies.
Obligation Application. The group of negotiable obligations, as was mentioned,
should be selected by users to specify their preferences according usage of data. For
that we have included the application Obligations, shown in Figure 18. In that applica-
tion, negotiable obligations are grouped in sets of three obligations, optimal, acceptable
and minimum. One for each of the three negotiation rounds allowed. Per each set of
obligations a user can also add a priority value to set up the action to be performed in
case that the minimum obligation is not accepted.
6 Conclusions and Outlook
In this article, we presented a novel architecture that extends privacy control in a sub-
stantial matter and complements enterprise privacy with the incorporation of personal
privacy. We elaborated the set of requirements for personal privacy enforcement aimed
at maintaining the balance between Privacy Protection, Service Usability, and User
Manageability. Based on these requirements, we designed and implemented a Trusted
Privacy Manager, called UCPF, to control and monitor the context disclosure of a user
to third parties during collection, access and secondary use. Furthermore, the UCPF
provides a set of graphic tools to enable personal privacy management for non-expert
users.
Also, we were showcasing some typical sample applications in the field of mobile
services as they may be common in pervasive environments. Obviously, our scope is not
limited to such applications but can easily be extended to other services as well because
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of the flexible and extensible nature of our framework, together with the use of a service-
oriented approach for deployment of new services, rules and sets of obligations.
As part of our ongoing research, we were integrating the UCPF already into the
demonstrator of the IST project CONNECT where mobile healthcare personnel are
managing their privacy settings using our system model. Also current work includes
the creation of demonstrators and questionnaires for deploying privacy-enabled tools at
the Public University of Navarra for showcasing applications in the context of services
found at a University, such like a blackboard application for finding homework partners.
Our future work includes to apply our framework to privacy-sensitive applications in
the context of patient-monitoring and -supervision, as being found in integrated hospital
IT landscapes. There we are about to start work in the context of the ITEA2 project
AIMES.
Altogether we are convinced that especially the dynamic and flexible nature together
with the explicit user-focus of our work is a great contribution to the field of privacy
protection in pervasive computing.
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